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CASE COMMENT

VALORIZING THE SUBJUNCTIVE:
THE UNFORTUNATE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION OF
R v. CAROSELLA
JIM SMITHt and RICHARD HAIGHt

Nick Carosella owes his freedom from conviction on gross indecency
charges not to a single judge or jury, but to two entities whom he has
never met. These two-the Supreme Court of Canada and the Windsor
Sexual Assault Crisis Centre-have transformed a handful of written
notes into an ambiguous extension of the concept of relevance. The
latter organization, by destroying the complainant's counselling records,
forced the former to revisit, via the Charter, 1 the relevance of such
records. At the end of the day, the fates of Carosella and his alleged
victim seem almost incidental to the Court's latest instalment in an
ongoing foundational confrontation over whether, and if so, the way in
which, the rules of evidence might need to be customized in cases of
sexual assault.
In the recently-released decision R. v. Carosella,2 Sopinka J. (in the
majority) and L'Heureux-Dube ]. (in the minority) continue to illustrate the stark conceptual and doctrinal gulf which separates those
Justices who see no need for the law to recognize or adapt to social
t B.A. (Queen's), M.A. (Concordia), LLB. (Osgoode), Toronto, Ontario.
:j: Lecturer and Research Fellow, School of Law, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.

1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Parr I of the Constitution Act, I 982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act I982 (U.K.), I982, c. II [hereinafter the Charter].
2 R v. Carosel&., [I997] I S.C.R. 80 [hereinafter Carosel&.].
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inequities beyond the ambit of the courtroom "contest," and those who
do. 3 The division in the court on the issue of production of records by
third parties in cases of alleged sexual assault was demonstrated in late
1995 in two cases: R. v. O'Connor4 and R v. Beharriell. 5 In the several
years since the cases arose, it has become commonplace for accused
persons to seek production of such records. The results of such applications have been inconsistent.
In response to the risk of possible disclosure of counselling records, a
number of sexual assault crisis counselling centres developed strategies
to defend the privacy of their clients. Such strategies typically consisted
of either not keeping records or destroying them. In Carosella it was the
latter, thereby causing Sopinka and L'Heureux-Dube JJ. to grapple
with, amongst others, three main points:
(i) the effect of unavailability;
(ii) the consequent inability to apply the 0 'Connor test for production; and
(iii) the Charter implications of such a situation for the accused.

In the course of their respective reasons, both justices make significant statements either extending or confirming their previous positions
on the relevance of such records. In contrast to the consistency of
L'Heureux-Dube J., Sopinka ]. makes significant alterations to his
earlier treatment of relevance. The rift in the Court seems to widen in
Carosella, as the undertone of thinly-veiled anger threatens to explode.
How much of this is due to mutual frustration at the further entrenchment of positions, and how much due to the tangential relation of the
3

D. L. Marcin, "Rising Expectations: Slippery Slope or New Horizon? The Consrimtionalization
of Criminal Trials in Canada" in J. Cameron, ed., The Charter's Impact on the Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 87 at 113, has characterized the tension in the current Court as
between "traditional visions of the role of the criminal law (resolving issues between an accused
and the state) against those of others who advocate more rransformative goals for the system
(such as the amelioration of historical inequities in the lives ofwomen and children)." Replicated
in Carosella as well in the voting pattern: Sopinka J. carries the case by a bare bur familiar
majoriry; L'Heureux-Dubc J. is joined in dissent by her three occasional bur familiar dissentients
on these and related issues. Martin's point is interesting to note given the context ofL'HeureuxDube J.'s opening words in Carosella:
The criminal justice system, being very much a human enterprise, possesses both the strengths
and frailties ofhumaniry. Lacking a flawless method for uncovering the truth, or a crystal ball
which can magically recreate events, the court attempts to determine an accused's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence before ir. This search for justice does not operate perfectly,
and in every trial there is likely to be some evidence bearing upon the case which does not
appear before the trier of fact. Still, sociery expects courts oflaw to ascertain that person's guilt
or innocence by way of a trial, and, subject to the uncertainties inherent in any human
enterprise, to render a verdict that is true and just. (Carosella, supra note 2 at II4)

4 R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter O'Connor].
5 A . (L.L.) v. B.(A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, (sub nom. R. v. Beharriel{) [hereinafter Beharriell].
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case to the main issue of the proper approach to evidence in sexual
assault cases is difficult to tell.
Moreover, there are at least two factors which make the case unfortunate both in its timing and in its effect. First, rather than an allegation of
sexual assault, the case involved a three-decade-old allegation of sexual
touching, thereby invoking the hotly-debated possibility of "recovered
memories," albeit without direct mention ofit. Second, the understandable but provocative action of the rape crisis centre in destroying records
has the not-unexpected effect of enraging that element of the court
which reveres the "rule of law" and sees the courts, not independent
third parties, as the ultimate, neutral arbiters of what information will or
will not be adjudged relevant and made available to the accused.
The focus of this paper is to assess the impact of Carosella on the
debate regarding relevance of third-party counselling records, and to
examine the case critically to determine if it is possible to extract
any consistent principle from it which can be applied to other forms
of third party record-keeping. The paper is divided into three parts. In
the first part is the background against which the decision in Carosella
must be viewed, as it pertains to the uneasy conjuncture of two essentially separate strands of thought about relevance originating from the
O'Connor case. In the second part the relevant facts and trial history of
the Carosella case are summarized. The third part is a critical analysis of
certain aspects of the reasoning employed in Carosella on relevance, with
reference to the critical literature which has grown up around the topic
of access to third party counselling records. In a brief conclusion, the
significance of the minority's observations on the nature of third-party
counselling records is reviewed. A suggestion is also made for an augmented first stage of the 0 'Connor test for production. This might then
address certain of the issues left unsolved by Carosella. 6 Finally, the
paper will consider whether even such a partial resolution will be
forthcoming in the near future.

I. THE O'CONNOR TEST FOR DISCLOSURE OF THIRD
PARTY COUNSELLING RECORDS
The subject matter of Carosella must be analyzed in terms of working
definitions of third-party records and relevance, and against the background of the standards set by the test in the 0 'Connor case.
6

This suggestion is a variant of that proposed by Marilyn T. MacCrimmon in her recent essay
"Trial by Ordeal" (1996) I Can. Crim. LR. 31 at 50 [hereinafter "Trial by Ordeal"]. Although
written prior to the Supreme Court decision in Carosella, the unhelpful nature of Carosella
makes such emendation all rhe more necessary.
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WORKING DEFINITIONS: RELEVANCE OF THIRD PARTY RECORDS

Carosella involved notes made by a non-professional rape crisis counsellor in an advice session with the alleged victim of sexual abuse. In
criminal matters, courts have classified these third party records differently in evidential terms from records held by the Crown. Third-party
records have been defined by L'Heureux-Dube]. in Beharriell as:
any record, in the hands of a third party, in which a reasonable expectation of
privacy lies. These records may include medical or therapeutic records,
school records, private diaries, social worker activity logs and so on.7

Both common law and the Charter guarantee that an accused will
have the right to make full answer and defence to the charges against
him. 8 Counsel for the accused is expected to conduct a full and vigorous
defence. Sexual assault is rarely committed in front of witnesses, and so
may all too easily devolve into a credibility contest. R. v. Stinchcombe 9
established that the Crown must make full and complete disclosure of
all information in its possession, exculpatory as well as inculpatory.
Nonetheless, the combination of changes made to the Criminal Code
under Bill C-49 10 via the Supreme Court's holding in R. v. Seaboyer 11
have stripped defence counsel of certain "traditional" avenues of attack
upon the credibility of the complainant.
Of course, these avenues find their basis in a number of deeplyembedded cultural myths and stereotypes concerning women who
complain of sexual assault. 12 The history oflaw's contribution to this is a
long and sad one. Women are typically characterized, in the eyes of the
law, as either possible rape victims or not. Similarly, the legal system
permits certain assumptions about the male rapist to flourish. Certain
injuries are required before a woman's complaint becomes plausible and
worth pursuing within the justice system. None of this is necessarily
expressly written into legislation, but arises through various myths that
insinuate themselves throughout the levels of our legal system:
7

8

Beharriel/, supra note 5 at 558-59.
Charter, ss. 7, 8, and I I. The gendered description will be used throughour this paper, given the
overwhelming preponderance of male accuseds and female complainants in sexual assault cases.

9

R v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 [hereinafter Stinchcombe].

Io An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38, s.
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276.

2,

amending the Criminal

11 R v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafter Seaboyer].
12 The remainder of this paragraph is based on the excellent exploration of the issue in L'HeureuxDube J.'s dissent in Sea boyer, ibid. which begins at 643. A numberof works are referred to in the
dissent, but for reasons of space, are omitted here. Readers are urged to refer to these sources for
a. more detailed analysis.
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(i) women are always able to prevent rapes if they really wish to;
(ii) rape does not occur between friends or relatives, but is a crime committed by strangers;
(iii) women are caricatures, either good or bad. The bad, which is a widely
drawn category including those typically marginalized, will always
consent to sex;
(iv) a woman's emotional nature means that true rape victims show predictable responses immediately after rape; and
(v) women are, by nature, vengeful and conniving.

While there are those who have taken issue with these stereotypes, it
is reasonable to assume that some of them, if not all, at the very least
work at a subconscious level-probably in the minds of both men and
women. Making records of the circumstances surrounding an event of
sexual assault may be helpful to the victim, but can also perpetuate these
very myths and stereotypes, especially (iv) and (v). Moreover either the
presence or absence of records at trial can be immaterial and can play
into defence tactics by allowing lawyers in either case to capitalize on
contradictory expectations regarding the reporting of sexual assault-a
"proper" degree of shame should produce reticence to report, but
equally "proper" anger requires a response. 13
The type of records listed by L'Heureux-Dube J. in Beharriell in so
far as they relate to sexual assault cases, at least purport to contain
information about either the victim, the perpetrator, or the event on
which a charge is based. 14 It follows naturally, then, that defence counsel
would generally wish to have access to these records. However, as such
13

These "dilemmas" have a long history. Sixteenth and seventeenth century European witchcraft
trials are a notable example. Friedrich von Spee reported the following:
[T]o avoid the appearance that she [the accused "witch"] is indicted solely on the basis of
rumor, without other proofs, a certain presumption of guilt is obtained by posing the
following dilemma: Either she has led an evil and improper life, or she has led a good and
proper one. If an evil one, then she should be guilty. On the other hand, if she has led a good
life, this is just as damning; for witches dissemble and try to appear especially virtuous ...
Therefore the old woman is put in prision. A new proof is found through a second dilemma:
she is afraid or not afraid. If she is (hearing of the horrible tortures used against witches), this
is sure proof; for her conscience accuses her. If she does not show fear (trusting in her
innocence), this too is a proof; for witches characteristically pretend innocence and wear a
bold front.
From Cautio Criminalis (Precautions for Prosecutors), 1631. Quoted in C. Sagan, The Demon
Haunted World (New York: Ballantine, 1996) at 408.

14 The kind of information will vary considerably; this fuct will be dealt with in Part Ill of this

paper. Professor Joan Gilmour has observed that requests for access to such records only gained
impetus after these previous "old standbys" of myth and stereotype were lost after Seaboyer, see
]. M. Gilmour, "Counselling Records: Disclosure in Sexual Assault Cases" in J. Cameron, ed.,
The Charter's Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, I 996) 239 at 266.

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 32:1

records are in the hands of non-parties and not the Crown, and are of
course subject to some (variable) expectation of privacy, accessing the
records in the first place may be problematic. Unlike files in the
possession of the Crown, for which Stinchcombe established the presumption of relevance, counselling records remained elusively just outside the ambit of the proceedings.
Relevance lacks a legal definition per se, but is instead said to be a
judgment made by the trial judge according to "common sense and
experience." 15 This quality is discovered, generally, by reference to
"logic and general experience." tG Something is relevant if it tends to
make a fact more or less probable. How it "tends" to do so is, of
necessity, by way of a linking generalization. These are the bridges
between that which is offered and that which it is offered to prove or
disprove. A core problem is that a linking generalization is not a
"quality" of the thing, fact, or event offered as potential evidence. It is
generated by human beings in the hope of proving or disproving a matter
in issue. Consider the vastly different linking generalizations, after the
bombing in Oklahoma City, which might be attempted in relation to a
scrap of paper on which is scrawled the set of words, "fuel oil" and
"fertilizer." Of central concern in this essay is the nature of the generalizations which might persuade a finder of fact that missing counselling
records are relevant.
For the purpose of the analysis which follows, the conceptual categorization of relevance provided by Sopinka J. in R. v. Mohan t 7 is useful for
two reasons. First, his subcategories flag many of the topics found in
academic critiques related to counselling records and relevance. Second,
as Sopinka J. is the author of the majority judgment in Carosella, there is
a clear connection between the reasoning employed in each case.
In Mohan, Sopinka J. identifies relevance as the threshold requirement for the admission of evidence. Forcing a distinction, he unpacks
the notion of "logic and general experience" into an assessment of
information's logical relevance and its legal relevance. 18 In assessing
logical relevance, the question to be asked is whether the information
15 In R.

J.

Delisle, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 13.

16

Professor J. B. Thayer, quoted in Delisle, ibid. at 13.

17

R v. Mohan (1994), II4 D.L.R. (4th) 419 (5.C.C.) [hereinali:er Mohan]. Although Mohan dealt
with the admissibility of expert evidence, Sopinka J.'s comments regarding the nature of
relevance can generally be applied.

18

In fact, SopinkaJ. suggests the considerations involved here might better be viewed as a general
exclusionary rule. However, he asserts that "whether it is created as an aspect of[legal] relevance
or an exclusionary rule, the effect is the same" (Mohan, ibid. at 427). In general, he advances
admissibiliry considerations ro the relevance assessment stage.
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makes a matter or fact in issue more or less likely, based on an identifiable generalization. In assessing the legal relevance, probative value in
terms of necessity and reliabiliry are to be weighed against possible
prejudicial effects to determine whether a negative effect is out of
proportion to the reliabiliry of the evidence. Although Sopinka J.
derived this particular description of assessing relevance to deal with
expert evidence, it incorporates steps which will occur at some point in
the process in considering the relevance of any piece of information.
Cory J., in R. v. Osolin, 19 similarly advanced the admissibiliry criterion
of probative value versus prejudicial effect so that the test became
virtually synonymous with the threshold test of relevance assessment.
When, how, by whom, and in what manner this initial assessment for
relevance would be performed in the case of a request for production of
third-party counselling records not in the possession of the Crown, and
hence not available for disclosure under Stinchcombe, was codified by a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in O'Connor. In that case and
Beharriell (reasons released at the same time) it became clear that a
majoriry of the Court, while acknowledging the importance of the
privacy interest of the complainant in such records, would only allow
this interest to inform the structure of the test, not whether it would be
performed. Despite reference in Beharriell to Lamer C.J.'s statement in
C.B. C. v. Dagenais 20 that there is no hierarchy of Charter rights, a
pragmatic reading of both cases makes it plain that the Charterenhanced right of the accused to make full answer and defence effectively trumps privacy. 21 Beharriell ensures that any claim of privilege in
such records will also never prevent application of the procedure as set
out in O'Connor.

B.

THE O'CONNOR TEST

The process set out in 0 'Connor by which the defence may gain access to
third parry records-after a subpoena is issued, notice to record-holder
and complainant is given, and a request for an order to produce is made
at trial- involves two stages:
19

[1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 [hereinafter Osolin].

20

[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais].

21

This is also the implication behind the majority's decision in M.(A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R.
157 (L'Heureux-Dube J.'s dissent focuses on the need for Charter rights to privacy, in the
context of sexual assault cases, to be considered). Interestingly, a hierarchical view of rights
would seem to be supported by the fact that national security, for example, trumps the right to
full answer and defence (at least in the non-criminal context of removal hearings under the
Immigration Act)-see Canada (Min. ofEmployment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] I
S.C.R. 711; Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1995), 32 C.R.R. (2d) 295 (Fed. Ct. T.D.);
Albani v. R. (1995), 32 C.R.R. (2d) 95 (Fed. Ct. T.D.).
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Stage One-The accused must bring a formal written application supported by an affidavit setting out the specific grounds for production. The
onus is on the accused to satisfy the judge that the information is "likely to be
relevant." The judge must be satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility
that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial. If so, the
records must be produced to the judge for examination. 22
Stage Two-Once the records are produced to the court, the judge should
examine them to determine whether, or to what extent, the records should
be produced to the accused. At this stage-and this stage only-the judge
should consider the salutary and deleterious effects of production, and weigh
the privacy interest of the complainant and the right of the accused to make
full answer and defence. According to the majoriry, in balancing these
interests, the judge should be guided by five factors: necessity, probative
value, the privacy interest involved, whether production would be premised
on any discriminatory belief or bias, and possible prejudice to the
complainant. 23

Depending on the result of the above, all, some, or none of the
requested records will be produced to the accused. It is important to note
that although this procedure was developed in the specific context of
counselling records and sexual assault trials, the generality of the language employed presumably makes it applicable to all situations in
which third party records involve a privacy interest.

c.

CONTENT OF THE "LIKELY RELEVANCE" STANDARD: STAGE ONE

The majoriry2 4 in O'Connor, having confined the stage one test to a bare
"likely relevance" threshold, develops the content of this test in some
detail: "the onus ... should not be interpreted as an evidential burden
requiring evidence and a voir dire in every case;" production cases
require a "higher threshold" than in the disclosure context; it is "a
significant burden" but which "should not be interpreted as an onerous
burden" and should be "a low one." 25 In general, the relevance threshold "is simply a requirement to prevent the defence from engaging in
'speculative, fanciful, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and timeconsuming' requests for production." 26 The rationale for pitching the
22

23

O'Connor, supra note 4 at 434-41.
Ibid at 441-43.

24

This part concentrates only on setting our the bare bones of the 0 'Connor procedure as it stands
as the majority decision of the Supreme Court and therefore the law in Canada. Pertinent
aspects of the critique offered by the dissenting opinion of L'Heureux-Dube J. will be
incorporated, where appropriate, in Parr III.

25

O'Connor, supra note 4 at 435-37.

26 O'Connor, ibid at 438, quoting from R. v. Chaplin, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727.
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first relevance threshold so low is that the defence is hindered by "not
knowing precisely what is in the records." 27
In response to several criticisms of this low threshold 28 by L'HeureuxDube ]., the majority go on to illustrate "likely relevance" and materiality by reference to cases in which there may be "a close temporal
connection between the creation of the records and the decision to bring
charges;" where the information might concern "the unfolding of events
underlying the ... complaint;" the "use of a therapy which influenced
the complainant's memory;" and information that bears on
credibility. 29
In essence, the initial stage inquires only into the logical relevance,
while legal relevance, and particularly probative value versus prejudice,
are only considered in the second stage, after production to the judge
alone. It is clear from the above that the majority views the first stage of
the production analysis as different in kind and effect from production
to the defence.
L'Heureux-Dube J., in dissent, contends that assuming relevance for
therapeutic records in sexual assault cases is "highly questionable" and
that such information as they do contain is either not relevant or only
attenuatedly so. 30 In an attempt to refute this criticism, the majority
cites:
the reality that in many criminal cases, trial judges have ordered the
production of third party records .... The sheer number of decisions in
which such evidence has been produced supports the potential relevance of
therapeutic records. 31

In Beharriel~ Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J. confirmed the "procedure
and substantive law to be followed," which they had set out in 0 'Connor,
and invited the unsuccessful respondent to renew his request for production of records in line with those procedures. L'Heureux-Dube J., again
in dissent, provided an exhaustive analysis of the unsuitability of the use
of class privilege (and, less certainly, case-by-case privilege) 32 to attempt
27

Ibid.

28

And the segregation of all other factors to the second stage.

29

0 'Connor, supra note 4 at 439-41.

30 Ibid. at 48 I and 498.
31

Ibid. at 440. Sopinka J.'s willingness to supply hypothetical ways in which information
contained in therapeutic records might be relevant, discloses something dangerously close to a
"linking generalization" in favour of the relevance of records not-yet-seen. Similarly, the use ofa
mere statistical answer ro doubts expressed about the likelihood of relevance of a category of
information, as here, would seem to pre-supply the answer to the onus on the accused. See,
generally, MacCrimmon, "Trial by Ordeal," supra note 6.

32

L'Heureux-Dube J. nearly summarizes the distinction between class and case-by-case privilege
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to block production of counselling records. 33 Easily overlooked is her
suggestion that after the receipt of the subpoena, and prior to the first
stage of the O'Connor application, "[i]t may be useful ... for the third
party to prepare a list of the records in its possession." 34
It was within this legal framework, and in an environment in which
applications for therapeutic records had become pro fonna defence
manoeuvres in sexual assault cases, 35 that rape counselling centres felt
forced to consider some form of self-help to protect the privacy interests
of their clients. 36 It was therefore only a matter of time before a case like
Carosella arose.

IL JUDICIAL HISTORY OF R v. CAROSELLA
Nick Carosella, a teacher, was charged in 1993 with gross indecency for
allegedly having sexual contact with the complainant between l 964 and
l 966, when she was a grade 7 and 8 student. A year prior to the charge
being laid, the complainant had sought advice from a counsellor at the
Windsor Sexual Assault Crisis Centre ("the Centre") about how to lay
charges for the alleged sexual abuse decades earlier. She was interviewed
for an hour and a half to two hours by a social worker, who took notes,
in Beharriell: class privilege is a prima facie presumption that communications are inadmissible
based on rhe category of relationship; for example, husband and wife, or solicitor and client. In
case-by-case privilege, as the name implies, admissibility is decided in a particular case by
reference to the four-seep Wigmore criteria: Beharrie/4 supra note 5 at 562-63, see also R. v.
Gruenke, [1991) 3 S.C.R. 263 at 286.
33

In doing so, L'Heureux-Dube J. lays to rest any further attempt to move in the direction (only
sporadically successful) ofU.S. counselling centres' attempts to invoke either common-law, or,
increasingly, qualified statutory privilege. For comprehensive treatment of such struggles by
U.S. writers, see for example: M. B. Hogan, "The Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for
Rape Crisis Counselling: A Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights Versus a Rape
Victim's Right to Confidential Therapeutic Counselling" (1989) 30 Bos. Coll. L. Rev. 411;
A. Y. Joo, "Broadening the Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege to Protect the Privacy of the
Sexual Assault Survivor" (1995) 32 Harv. J. Legis. 255; M. Laurence, "Rape Victim-Crisis
Counselor Communications: An Argument for an Absolute Privilege" (1984) 17 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1213; M. H. Neuhauser, "The Privilege of Confidentiality and Rape Crisis Counselors"
(1985) 8 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 185; K. E. Williamson, "Confidentiality of Sexual Assault
Victim-Counselor Communications: A Proposed Model Statute" (1984) 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 461;
and C. J. Scarmeas, "R,1.pe Victim-Rape Crisis Counselor Communications: A New Testimonial Privilege" (1982) 86 Dick. L. Rev. 539. See also Beharrie/4 supra note 5 at 558-81.

34

Beharrie/4 supra note 5 at 585. Although inconsequential in the current situation, this could be
useful in the amended version of the first stage relevance test suggested in the conclusion, where
information concerning the type of record kept, if adequately described, may be important. See
Conclusion, below.

0 'Connor. A cursory search of the
Quick.law "Canadian Judgements" database in February 1997 indicated hundreds of cases,
across the country, in which applications based on the 0 'Connor formulation seemed to have
been made.

35 This defence tactic became even more widespread after

36 As had been done by similar centres in the U.S. since the late 1970s; see authors cited supra note

33.
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and who advised the complainant that whatever she said could be
subpoenaed to court. The complainant accepted that. She went home
from the interview and immediately contacted police.
During the preliminary inquiry, counsel for the accused brought an
unopposed application for production of the Centre's files. The file
produced to the trial judge did not contain interview notes. A subsequent voir dire revealed, through evidence of the Centre's executive
director, that the notes from the complainant's file had been among
hundreds shredded in April I 994. As a result of many previous failures in
opposing production, the Centre had adopted a two-pronged policy:
(i) notes were to be taken in a way which made them useless if produced,
concentrating on feelings rather than events, avoiding direct statements,
truncation and other devices; and
(ii) notes taken in matters with "police involvement" were to be shredded
prior to their being subpoenaed.37

The social worker who had shredded the roughly ten pages of notes
had no recollection of their contents. The Crown then submitted, in lieu
of the missing notes, a collection of transcripts and affidavits. These
formed the factual basis for the accused's application for a stay based on
an inability to make full answer and defence. The matter was decided in
favour of the accused at trial, but was reversed at the Ontario Court of
Appeal.

A.

THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE

Ouellette J., while holding a) that the onus was on the accused to show
that destruction of the notes" create[d] a prejudice to the accused of such
magnitude and importance that it can fairly be said to amount to a
deprivation of the opportunity to make full answer and defence," 38 and
b) that the court should not speculate as to the contents of the notes,
nevertheless concluded:
that there is no speculation in coming to the conclusion that the notes of
those interviews . . . relate to alleged sexual incidents in this trial and,
therefore, are relevant and material and would more likely than not tend to assist
the accused. 39

The judge granted a stay, since the accused had been deprived of the
opportunity to introduce inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence
37

Sec Carosella, supra note

2

at

92.

38 R v. Carosella (1994), 35 C.R. (4th) 301 (Ont. Cr. (Gen. Div.)) at 305.
39

Ibid at 306 [emphasis added].
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"that might be sufficient to cause the jury to question the reliability of
the complainant." 40

B.

THE FIRST APPEAL

On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the panel of Catzman,
Osborne, and Abella JJ.A. found that the judge had made a "leap of
logic" regarding how and on what basis missing records might prejudice
the accused's Charter right to make full answer and defence. The
appellate panel held that the possibility of the notes being of assistance
to the defence was "obscure," in that:
[t]he missing notes were not a verified account of what the complainant said.
The notes did not constitute a written statement of the complainant, who
never read, reviewed or signed them. 41

Further, the panel held that the probable effect of the lost notes
should have been judged in light of the amount of other material
available to the defence, which included the investigating police officer's
notes, the complainant's statement to police, written statements of three
Crown witnesses and the complainant's preliminary inquiry evidence.
C.

THE SUPREME

CouRT

The appeal proceeded to the Supreme Court, where a bare majority
overturned the appeal judgment and reinstated the stay granted at first
instance. Details of the reasoning will appear, where appropriate, in the
analysis which follows in Part III. Although not directly pertinent to the
narrow focus of this essay, it is interesting to note that the majority
reasons are replete with arguable contentions, each worthy of further
analysis. These include:
(i) Sopinka J., for the majority, grounds the breach of the accused's right to
make full answer and defence on the premises that: first, the right to
production from third parties is as constitutionally-based as the right to
production from the Crown (para. 26); and second, it would be
fundamentally unfair to require the accused to show that the missing
notes-which the defence could not see-prejudiced the conduct of
his defence. Analogizing with the wiretap case of R. v. Farinacci 42 and
the Cabinet documents case of Carey v. Ontario, 43 Sopinka J. asserts
40 Ibid. at 97.
41 R. v. Carosella (1995), 26 0.R. (3d) 209 (C.A.) at

42 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469 [hereinafter Farinacci].
43

[1986]

2

S.C.R. 637.
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that it is the very unavailability of the notes which places the accused in
an untenable position. 4 4
(ii) Sopinka J. held that the fact that the complainant consented to the production of the counselling records "met the threshold test for disclosure
or production." 45 He observes that the complainant's consent was
required, not the Centre's, that the right to confidentiality "resides in
the complainants" and that the destruction of the records without
consent of the complainant violates that right to confidentiality. 46
(iii) This case is to be distinguished from "lost evidence cases generally"
because the Centre made a decision "to obstruct the course of justice"
and thereby usurped the role of the court in deciding which evidence is
to be produced or admitted. 47

Each of the above three claims would seem to represent significant
reinterpretations, revisions, or misstatements of the law. The first, if
true, would seem to make the entire 0 'Connor exercise rather futile. The
second evinces a rather skewed logic, which would require further
elaboration. The third seems to either present a shaky foundation for the
extreme remedy of a stay, or to place undue emphasis on imputed
motives of non-parties. The presence of such claims in the judgment
cannot help but exert some pressure on the credibility of the main
holding in the case. It is an examination of that to which we now turn.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING IN CAROSELLA
In this section two questions are asked. First, how satisfying is the
majority judgment in Carosella as an exercise in exploring the meaning
of the standard set in O'Connor, generally, for production of third party
records? Second, what kind of guidance does it provide for future
cases- not only in the area of sexual assault allegations, but also for
production of third party records generally?
44 It must be noted that in both cases cited by SopinkaJ., the material not disclosed was

central to

the issue; in fact, the portion of Farinacci quoted includes the observation by Doherty J.A. that
what has not been disclosed is the "very material which is crucial to demonstrating either
prejudice or fraud" (supra note 41 at 102). We query whether the counselling notes are as
"cent rat" in Carosella.
45

Carosella, supra note 2 at 107. In so doing, he correctly observes thatthis was the position taken
by the Court of Appeal as well. Absent evidence of any request by the Crown for the documents,
Sopinka J. is presumably referring to the complainant's lack of reluctance for the notes to be
subpoenaed.

46

Ibid It is difficult to determine what Sopinka J. is saying here, in that he seems to imply that by
making the records permanently unavailable, the Centre somehow violated the complainant's
confidentialiry, rather than-it would seem-enhancing it. It is possible he is confusing or
conflating a questionable right of access, or some form of property right, with the right of
confidentialiry.

47

Ibid. at II+
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J.'s

VALORIZATION OF

THE SUBJUNCTIVE
I. FLAWED LOGIC

One clear subtext of Sopinka J. 's reasoning is his susp1C1on of the
possibility of"recovered memories." This is evident when, in generating
a list of hypothetical ways in which the missing notes may have been
useful, he speculates that the notes "could have revealed some statements were the result of suggestions from the interviewer." 48 This must
be read in context of the concern over this "type" of therapy, which had
prompted Sopinka J. and Lamer C.J. in 0 'Connor to include in their
speculative "illustration" of how counselling records may be relevant in
sexual assault cases: "they may reveal the use of a therapy which
influenced the complainant's memory of the alleged events." 49 It' might
appear that any allegation of abuse situated a certain distance in the past
will invoke-for at least these Justices-such a suspicion. We query
whether disclosure of notes, as opposed to questioning of the therapist
involved, is the more admissible way of dealing with such a concern.
Relevance in this context becomes a little suspect.
The engine driving Sopinka J.'s logic is quite clearly anger at the
actions of the Centre, a reaction cautioned against by L'Heureux-Dube
J. 50 Suspicion and anger, working together, cause him to transform an
unknown quantity into such a certain one that he feels justified in
reconfirming the trial judge's assertion that not only are the missing
records both relevant and material, bur also that they would more likely
than not tend to assist the accused. It is the very quality of "missingness"
which seems to fill Sopinka J. with such certainty:
there was abundant evidence before the trial judge to enable him to conclude
that there was a reasonable possibility that the information contained in the
notes ... was logically probative to an issue at the trial as to the credibility of
the complainant. This information, therefore, would have satisfied the test
for disclosure established in Stinchcombe but as well the higher test in
0 'Connor. 51

In effect, Sopinka J. sidesteps entirely the first, "likely relevance,"
threshold stage of the 0 'Connor procedure, by accepting that the
complainant's waiver of confidentiality constitutes fulfilment of the
"significant ... but not onerous burden" proposed by the majority in
48

Ibid. at

49

O'Connor, supra note 4 at 44r.
Carosella, supra note 2 at I 54Ibid at 110 [emphasis added].

50
5I

109.
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0 'Connor. 52 It is apparently the complainant's waiver which causes
Sopinka J. to seemingly conflate the two notions-disclosure by the
Crown and production by third parties-and to claim, as if they were
virtually synonymous, the satisfaction of both the Stinchcombe and the
0 'Connor standard:
[g]iven the circumstances, it is clear that the file would have been disclosed
the Crown. As material in possession of the Crown, only the Stinchcombe
standard would have applied. But even if the somewhat higher O'Connor
standard relating to production from third parties applied, it was met in this
case. Once the material satisfied the relevance test of O'Connor, the balancing required in the second stage of the test would have inevitably resulted in
an order to produce.5 3
to

Given that he offers no reasoned basis in 0 'Connor or elsewhere for
the interchangability of the two concepts upon waiver, 54 L'HeureuxDube J. is correct to begin her reasons by reminding the majority that
the case is not about disclosure.
Although his reasoning should by all rights make it unnecessary to
consider how the missing records might have been relevant (in answer to
the stage one question of likely relevance), Sopinka J. provides such
reasons in abundance:
(i) the notes related to the alleged sexual incidents, and they might have
been able to shed light on the "unfolding of events" or contained
information bearing on credibility;
(ii) the notes dealt with her initial disclosure, and were the first written
record of the allegations;
(iii) the interview lasted one and three-quarter hours, and had the notes
contained inconsistencies upon which the complainant could be crossexamined, the notes might have affected the outcome in favour of the
accused;
(iv) the accused could have made use of information in the notes, perhaps
to cross-examine on inconsistent statements;
(v) though the notes were not statements of the complainant, they could
have provided a foundation for cross-examination, in that if they
conflicted with other evidence, the witness could be cross-examined
52 Ibid. at 107. See also O'Connor, supra note 4 at 41.
53 Ibid at 107 [emphasis added].
54 That is, aside from the ethically-questionable but pragmatic suggestion implicit in O'Connorthat complainants may "protect" themselves from a violation of privacy by failing to tell the

Crown about counselling; thus, with no waiver, there may end up being no disclosure. Whether
the opposite is true, that waiver invokes a right to disclosure, thus leaping over the likely
relevance threshold, is nor certain.
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on the inconsistency, and if denied, the statement could be proved by
calling the note-taker;
(vi) the notes could have assisted in preparing cross-examination
questions;
(vii) the notes may have revealed the state of the complainant's perception
and memory;
(viii) the notes could have revealed that some statements were the result of
suggestions from the interviewer; and
(ix) the notes might have pointed the defence toward other witnesses. 55

Unfortunately, in view of the stated intention in 0 'Connor of posing
the "likely relevance" threshold as an avowedly "not onerous" obstacle
to requests for production by defence counsel which are merely "speculative [and] fanciful," 56 there would seem to be a very high level of
speculation indeed involved in the reasons for relevance he supplies.
Having aggregated such a list of reasons for the relevance of the records,
Sopinka J. apparently has no trouble persuading himself that they
together constitute "abundant evidence" that there was a reasonable
possibility the information in the notes was "logically probative ... as to
the credibility of the complainant." 57 The problem with such
a statement is, of course, that there was no evidence at all before the
trial judge, as there was none before Sopinka J. The "evidence" of
relevance only exists at the level of speculation, all framed in the
subjunctive world of "if," "might," and "could have." The totality of
SopinkaJ.'s statements regarding "likely relevance" can be reduced to a
simple premise: there might have been something in the notes on which
to pin an attack on the complainant's credibility. As such, the essence of
Sopinka J .' s holding regarding relevance of the records is confined to an
elaborate rationalization for the very sort of unsubstantiated fishing
expedition the 0 'Connor inquiry was meant to preclude. For Sopinka J.,
the missing records are presumptively relevant, as they were for the
trial judge before him. Whatever onus is ostensibly provided by the
O'Connor procedure's first stage is, for the majority, automatically
fulfilled. L'Heureux-Dube J. at least disagrees, and would require some
less speculative showing of how the missing documents may have met
the "likely relevance" threshold.
It is difficult to conceive that records held by a Children'sAid Society,
or a psychiatrist, or a grief counsellor, in some other context, would elicit
such a frenzy of speculation in the majority. This aspect of the majority
55
56
57

Carosella, supra note 2 at 108-09.
O"Connor, supra note 4 at 438.
Carosella, supra note 2 at 11 o.
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judgment would also seem to localize the treatment of third party
records in this way to the specific area of sexual assault allegations.
Absent such a specific charge, it may be that the "likely relevance"
threshold would be more difficult to surmount. Unhappily, no indication that this is so arises from Sopinka J.'s holding in Carosella. The
seemingly tidy 0 'Connor test, so nicely set out as a sequential algorithm
that recognizes vying interests in privacy and disclosure, delivers much
less than it promises.
2. UNACCEPTABLE GENERALIZATIONS

The "missingness" of the records is a fact with which the Court is faced,
but their absence casts a long shadow, in that the majority finds their
likely content to be relevant. The question naturally arises is, how this
can be? What generalizations in aid of relevance are used to achieve this
curious result?
Bruce Feldthusen, in commenting on O'Connor, identifies possible
attitudinal bases for such a finding of relevance:
As a practical matter, whether the onus of proof for production to a judge
alone is high or low probably matters relatively little. Far more important is
the de facto presumption for or against likely relevance that the individual
judge, perhaps unknowingly, applies to the question of production .... [In
O'Connor] the minority believes that such information is rarely relevant; the
majority simply disagrees. Obviously this crucial background, virtually
unchallengeable in any particular trial, will have more impact on the
question of production than any debate over the subtleties oflegal onus ....
In the long run, perhaps the greatest contribution of the O'Connor decision
will be its explicit exposure of the significance of judicial attitudes to legal
decision making. 58

It is quite apparent that Sopinka J. is operating on the assumption
that private counselling records are usually relevant; the in extremis
situation in Carosella, in which the records are gone forever, would
appear to only strengthen that assumption, since why else would the
Centre destroy records?
The possible relation of background judicial attitudes to the disapproved myths and stereotypes enumerated by L'Heureux-Dube J. in
Seaboyer is mentioned by Bruce Feldthusen in the course of a restrained
observation on the circularity of the majority's reasoning in 0 'Connor. 59
58

B. Feldthusen, "Access to the Private Therapeutic Records of Sexual Assault Complainants"
(1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 537 at 548.

59

Ibid at 549. In response to L'Heureux-Dube J.'s observation that third party records are
unlikely to be relevant, the majority states that the number of judges who have ordered
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An examination of the reasons for possible relevance supplied by
SopinkaJ. indicates that it is very difficult for him to exorcize himself of
certain persistent myths and stereotypes. Many of the reasons offered
evince an underlying premise that the credibility of women complaining
of earlier episodes of sexual assault is inherently questionable; others,
that counselling records will almost as a matter of course contain
statements on which to challenge the complainant's account; and still
others, that a complaint such as that in Carosella is a manifestation of
"recovered memories," possibly induced by a counsellor. Some generalizations behind certain of Sopinka J.'s reasons for relevance remain
unclear-as in the claim oflikely relevance because the statemems to a
counsellor were the only ones not made to the police or at the preliminary inquiry. 60 It is hard not to conclude, as does Sadie Bond in the
context of discussing the use of psychiatric history evidence, that it may
be the very pervasiveness of the myths which makes credibility the
primary issue for Sopinka J. in Caroseffa. 61 Echoing Feldthusen, Bond
observes that "[t]he question of relevance is decided based on beliefs
rather than truth." 62 She theorizes that entrenched attitudes and beliefs
are quite adaptable to changes in law, and that distrust and disbelief of
women grounded in myth and stereotype are capable of finding new
sites: 63
As the introduction of the victim's sexual history is now restricted in Canada
by statute, the use of psychiatric history evidence is likely to be seen ... as an
attractive alternative .... While the law regarding the admissibility of past
sexual history has changed in Canada, the attitudes that resulted in its
admission in the past have not. These same attitudes will result in the
admission of psychiatric history evidence. 64

L'Heureux-Dube J. warned of this in her dissent in O'Connor:
This Court has recognized the pernicious role that past evidentiary rules in
both the Criminal Code and the common law, now regarded as discriminatory, once played in our legal system.... We must be careful not to permit
such practices to reappear under the guise of extensive and unwarranted
inquiries into the past histories and private lives of complainants of sexual
assault. We must not allow the defence to do indirectly what it cannot do
production, in itself, supports the likely relevance of such records.
60

This might well be a manifestation of an unenumerated but hopefully impermissible stereotype
of "conspiring women."

61

S. Bond, "Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims: The Need for Fundamental Change
in the Determination of Relevance" (1993) Dal. L.J. 416 at 427.
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directly under s. 276 of the Code. This would close one discriminatory door
only to open another. 6 5
In the context of medical record disclosure, L'Heureux-Dube J. had
also warned of this danger earlier in R v. Osolin:
[B]ecause of the beliefs which have typically informed notions of relevance
and credibility in sexual assault trials, the mere existence of challenges to
credibiliry on mental or psychiatric grounds in a sexual assault trial raises
serious questions about the persistence of rape myths. 66
This is not to say that Sopinka J. has consciously set out to assess the

likely relevance of the missing records on the basis of impermissible
stereotypes; rather, that the outrage he feels at third-party self-help has
forced him to make a "leap of logic," as did the trial judge below. His
generation of a string of hypothetical examples of possible relevance is,
as Marilyn MacCrimmon has pointed out, an untrustworthy way to
proceed, as resorting to hypotheticals "impl[ies] a set of assumptions
about social facts, but do[ es] not highlight the necessity of evaluating
the truth of these assumptions." 67 Sopinka J.'s leap of logic has been
made all the easier by the elusive nature of the "likely relevance"
standard set by 0 'Connor.
One further impression left by the majority's reasons is troubling.
Despite the holding in O'Connor that the threshold of relevance for
production of third party records should be higher than in the context of
disclosure by the Crown (where relevance is expressed as information
that may be useful to the defence), 68 Sopinka J.'s sole focus seems
to be on possible usefulness of the records to the defence. He makes no
effort to impose any higher standard. While many things may be useful
to a defence, such as: age, race, class, and previous sexual history of
the complainant; the alleged goal in creating a two-step process in
O'Connor, and the direction of much of recent jurisprudence in the area
of sexual assault, has been to ensure that that usefulness did not remain
the sole criterion for disclosure.
In summary, in Carosella, the majority seeks to establish relevance by
fiat, generating a number of hypothetical reasons for the likely relevance
of the missing records which appear to be dangerously close to being
based on illegitimate myths and stereotypes. At the same time, Sopinka
J. creates out of whole cloth the argument that waiver by the complain65 0 'Connor, supra note 4 at 488.
66 Osolin, supra note I 9 at 624.

67 M. T. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1991-1992 Term: Truth,
Fairness and Equaliry" (1993) 4 Sup. Cr. L. Rev. (2d) 225 at 27r.
68 O'Connor, supra note 4 at 436.
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ant somehow independently fulfils the likely relevance onus. No serious
consideration is given to what the content of the likely relevance
standard might be. Sopinka ]., and the majority he carries with him,
appear willing to make unavailability itself sufficient cause for an
automatic finding of logical relevance. For those seeking guidance, the
most that can be learned is that if it is not there, it is likely relevant. 69
Viewed in its most positive light, the majority has placed above all other
considerations the right of the accused to access any and all information,
in whomever's hands, and has indicated the likely remedy when that
information is, for some reason, unavailable. 70 Viewed less charitably,
the majority has at best provided lessons in the durability of certain
entrenched myths, and the apparent inability of the initial O'Connor
"likely relevance" inquiry to prevent their resurgence.

B.

CAROSELLA AS GurnE TO FUTURE "LIKELY RELEVANCE" INQUIRIES

Both O'Connor, in which guidelines for third party records were developed, and Carosella, in which these guidelines were applied in the case of
missing records, involved allegations of decades-old sexual assault. Both
cases involved counselling records originally in the possession of individuals too disparate to forward a claim for privilege. 71 Despite this
narrow basis, the guidelines purport to address the wider issue of third
party records in which a complainant's privacy interest is involved. It is
incumbent on the Court to clarify not just how the guidelines will be
interpreted, but also to offer clarification as to how to translate their
treatment of the issue of such records beyond the narrow focus of these
rwo cases. This will be difficult, if not impossible, due in part to several
peculiarities of the cases, and questions left unanswered.
Two factors limit the usefulness of Carosella for understanding how to
apply the O'Connor test for production of third parry counselling
69

An interesting parallel worth exploring, but outside the scope of this paper, might be with the
move in some jurisdictions, such as the U .K. and Australia, towards removing traditional
safeguards such as drawing negative inferences from an accused's silence, and allowing evidence
of criminal propensity to be admitted. Both take the notion of "relevance" beyond anything
contemplated in the past. Thankfully, these safeguards are entrenched in Canada under s. 11 of
the Charter, and therefore outside the ever-increasing reach of the Supreme Court.

70

Whether this extends beyond cases of sexual assault is highly questionable, given the Court's
release of R. v. Wicksted, [1997] I S.C.R. 307 (a missing police notebook did nor result in a stay of
charges, despite findings of questionable veracity on the pan of the officer involved) one week
after Carosella. A growing body of writing investigates the "special treatment" accorded sexual
assault accuseds; of particular interest regarding the gendered nature of the crime, and what
flows from it, is the essay by Bond, supra note 61.

71

This was the situation in Carosella (absent the destruction of the records) and in O'Connor at
least in pan. Ir forms the essence ofL'Heureux-Dube J.'s rejection of a claim for privilege of
such records. See Beharriell, supra note 5 at 577.
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records. The first factor arises from the underlying facts in the case. The
central issue in Carosella at all levels was the unavailability of the third
party records due to their destruction. How the majority's holding on
the likely relevance of the missing records will be applied in a case in
which the records still exist remains to be seen. The second factor
concerns the entrenchment of the division in the court on how to give
content to the initial likely relevance inquiry. Writing before the release
of the Court's reasons in O'Connor and Beharriell Professor Dianne
Martin correctly predicted the difficulty awaiting the Court in attempting to achieve consensus on the issue of third party disclosure of
counseiiing records. 72 Despite the Court's apparent agreement on what
has become known as the O'Connor application procedure, a close
reading of 0 'Connor clearly indicates that the majoriry and the minority
envisioned the application of two radically different visions of relevance
in the course of the inquiry. This absence of a meeting of the minds
around the core evidentiary consideration is made all the more apparent
in Carosella. Nothing in the majority or minority reasons offers hope for
consensus in the near future.
Two questions of particular importance are not only left unanswered
by the majoriry in Carosella, but become more of a mystery than
ever. The first question involves how to distinguish the difference
between the level of relevance needed regarding disclosure and that
needed to fulfil the higher standard for production of third party
records. L'Heureux-Dube]. at least attempts to grapple with the question of what should not be considered to fulfil the "higher" standard, as
she did previously in Osolin, O'Connor, and Beharriell. The second
question, its importance heightened by the ready (but unexplored)
availability of other methods of attacking the credibility of the complainant in the case, concerns what, if any, arguments for production of
third party counselling records could ever fall below the "likely relevance" standard as set by the majority.
The list of possible reasons for likely relevance of counselling records
held by third parties given by the majority in O'Connor73 forms the core
of the list of probable reasons for likely relevance provided by Sopinka J.
in Carosella. To this he has added a number of further reasons. There is a
real danger, post-Carosella, that the tendency to add-or select froman itemized list will make an order for production virtually automatic.
72

Martin, supra note 3 at

73

Information on the unfolding of events underlying the complaint, use of therapy influencing
memory of events, and information concerning credibiliry (with mention again of memory).
See O'Connor, supra note 4 at 44i.

II 3.

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 32:1

The vigilance advised by Professor Joan Gilmour is seemingly being
exercised by only a minority of the Court:
Courts applying O'Connor must be vigilant to ensure that the list the
majority compiled and other rationales defence counsel might advance in
future cases are not used as devices to give a more sophisticated and hence,
superficially more acceptable cloak to the same types of inquiry the Court
has already rejected as based on discriminatory or stereotypical reasoning. 74

Carosella provides no indication that the Court will be more vigilant
in future.
Even in the less frequent context of deliberately destroyed records,
vigilance will be subject to the whim (or, in Feldthusen's terminology,
background judicial attitudes) of individual judges. Gilmour cites another case arising from the Centre's destruction of files in which a stay
was not granted, and in which the onus was found not to have been met
by the defence. 75 Carosella will have a predictable effect on the almost
two hundred files of which the Centre also destroyed records. Its
precedential effect, if followed at trial or on appeal, will go a long way in
pushing the concerns of the minority even further into the background.
IV. CONCLUSION: ATTENDING TO THE NATURE OF
COUNSELLING RECORDS
It has become evident in the course of O'Connor, Beharriell and
Carosella that Lamer C.J., Sopinka, Coty, Iacobucci, and Major JJ. are
willing to treat sexual assault counselling records in the hands of third
parties categorically, as a discrete type of information. The creation
of a two-stage procedure with "likely relevance" as nominate threshold
must be seen as hovering somewhere between mere lip service and an
honest attempt to grapple with the attendant problems of complainants'
privacy concerns. It is evident in the two-paragraph invitation to
Beharriell to avail himself of the 0 'Connor procedure, that the majority
considers the problem well disposed of, and behind them. It remains for
L'Heureux-Dube J., constantly in dissent, to attempt to take a more
discerning, pragmatic and functional look at the nature of these records
and call the Court's attention to the fact that such records are, for the
most part hearsay, inherently unreliable, or not probative as prior
statements made by the complainant. In this she is supported by a
74 Gilmour,

75

supra note 14 at 268.
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growing chorus of academic writers. 76 Perhaps confident that few such
records will be found to fulfil the first stage test, or unwilling herself to
fully accept that disclosure to the judge alone is in and of itself a
violation of the complainant's privacy interest, L'Heureux-Dube J.
reserves her comments about the nature of such records for her analysis
of admissibility at trial, after they have been produced and examined. In
0 'Connor, she describes the substance of such records, echoing her
earlier observations in Osolin: 77
[n]otes of statements made by a complainant in a therapeutic context are
inherently unreliable because they are frequently not prepared contemporaneouslywith the statements, are not intended to be an accurate record of
the statements, and are not ratified by the complainant. Moreover, they
touch on a variety of topics not relevant to the issues at trial or the
complainant's competence to testify.7 8

This theme is elaborated in her reasons in Beharriell:
The questions asked by sexual assault counsellors encompass more than the
particular events in issue at trial; they include a wide range of elements such
as personal history, thoughts, emotions and other irrelevant information ....
Further, private records do not necessarily represent the precise words
spoken by the sexual assault complainants .... reliability or even the relevance
of private records ... are highly questionable. 79

In essence, therapy is not reportage. It is not about fact, but about
feeling. Self-blame is a well-documented aspect of the trauma associated
with sexual assault. Self-recrimination, in the sexual assault therapeutic
context, would seem to be as irrelevant, absent specific exceptions, as the
previous sexual history of a complainant. It is unfortunate, in light of
Carosella and what may follow, that L'Heureux-Dube ]. has not addressed her arguments concerning the nature of counselling records to
the initial "likely relevance" stage. While this would not have affected
the results in any of the cases mentioned, given the intransigence of the
majority, it would have begun to lay a base for an attempt to force
recognition of therapeutic records as a class of document highly unlikely
76

See for example, Bond, supra note 61; Feldthusen, supra note 58; Gilmour, supra note 14;
Marrin, supra note 3; Marilyn T. MacCrimmon & Christine Boyle, "Equality, Fairness and
Relevance: Disclosure ofTherapists' Records in Sexual Assault Trials" in Canadian Institute for
the Administration ofJ ustice, Filtering and Analyzing Evidence in anAge ofDiversity (Montreal:
Editions Themis, 1995) at 81; and A. Neufeld, "A.(L.L.) v. B.(A.): A Case Comment on the
Production of Sexual Assault Counselling Records" (1995) 59 Sask. L. Rev. 335.
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to be legally relevant, as suggested by MacCrimmon. 80 In a similar vein,
Bruce Feldthusen has recently suggested that the examination of the
probative value versus prejudicial effect of such a class of documents
might better be located at the initial relevance consideration. 81
Both suggestions have considerable merit. Unfortunately, privacy
arguments have not proven adequate at constructing a high enough
initial "likely relevance" threshold, nor have arguments regarding the
inhibitory effects of disclosure, even to a judge alone. 82
Attention to the specific nature of counselling records at an earlier
stage in the development of this area of law would have significantly
enriched and helped define the contem of the "likely relevance" standard set out in O'Connor. In our view, an enhanced test, in which the
first onus upon the accused would be to argue the relevance of the type of
record being requested without reference to the specific case at hand, is a
better solution. Such a burden could be "significant but not onerous,"
but would at least require initial proof that the record was created in
such a way that it would guarantee the possibility of being a trustworthy
"prior statement of the complainant," or that it was created in a context
in which counsellors actually did attempt to help the complainant
" recover " memones.
.
Given the body of knowledge about therapeutic counselling, and
the possible willingness of counsellors to share their general recordproducing strategy, substantive arguments could be made in something
other than an incipient and speculative vacuum. Such an amended test,
focusing on the nature of record-taking and the substance of the counselling relationship, and not an individual complainant's records, might
be able to impede to a certain degree the return of the seeminglyirrepressible discriminatory myths and stereotypes.
Although forestalling fishing expeditions to the undoubted frustration of the accused, benefits would accrue on a number of fronts. The
complainant could be assured that certain types of records are unlikely
to be produced. Counselling centres could devise guidelines less crafty
than those developed by the Windsor Centre in order to ensure records
were safe. The court would have the ability to widen the argument to a
more abstract level concerning the nature of the specific type of records
in third-party hands, without having to theorize and decide blindwith as little information as the accused-regarding "likely relevance"
of individual records.
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Unfortunately, such a revision is not foreseeable. In an almost classic
illustration of the adage "hard cases make bad law," no one but Nick
Carosella gained from the recent decision in Carosella. The Crown has
been put in the awkward position that, once having decided to prosecute
their case, it may be thwarted by unknowable prior actions of independent third parties. The Supreme Court of Canada has once again
replicated its seemingly irreparable division on matters of evidence
pertaining to sexual assault, and has done little to attest to its rejection of
certain harmful myths and stereotypes. The Charter has once again been
shown to be an instrument of some ambiguity and little utility in
attending to the rights of sexual assault victims. Women who have been
sexually assaulted may now be faced with the additional painful decision
of whether to seek counselling in order to deal with the effect of the
assault, or forego counselling in order to increase the chance that their
assailant will be tried on the merits. Finally, relevance, a crucial and
necessarily unbounded concept of the law of evidence has not been
clarified-and may have been muddied further.

